Editors decide which manuscripts are published in scientific journals, and ties between editors and authors may distort these decisions. I follow the professional networks of the 594 editors at 28 leading economics journals between 1996 and 2025, formed by their former coauthors, their departmental colleagues, and their former PhD students. Using variation in the timing of editorial appointments, I find that connected authors publish 8.6% more in a journal while a connected editor is in office. This additional work is cited no differently than the same authors' other publications in the same journal, so it does not reflect lower editorial standards. The publication gains of affiliated colleagues and of coauthors who keep working with the editor extend to similar journals and to their complete research output, consistent with editorial knowledge spillovers, while coauthors whose collaboration with the editor has lapsed gain nothing. I find no evidence of quality-lowering favoritism, yet the benefits of editorial knowledge concentrate at the few institutions that hold the most editorships.